Book
The Art of Coercion: Credible Threats and the Assurance Dilemma (forthcoming 2025 with Cornell University Press, Studies in Security Affairs series)
Successful coercive strategies require not only that I credibly threaten you until you comply, but also that I credibly assure you that I will not punish you after you comply. This is the dilemma at the heart of coercion. In my book, I show that threats often fail because they are insufficiently conditional in the eyes of targets.
I examine cases of coercive bargaining over nuclear weapons programs, especially in South Africa, Iraq, Libya, and Iran. I rely on primary documents from the U.S. government, the South African apartheid-era government, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). I supplement my archival research with the memoirs, recollections, and writings of policymakers, military leaders, and nuclear scientists. I also conduct interviews with participants.
An article based on the book was published in International Security.